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ABSTRACT

What factors help or hinder democratization in China? Democracy in China is not
an unknown term, but the difficulty of making “democratic” reforms in China has raised
the question of if China will democratize. This literature review and analysis will
examine the factors, which help or hinder democratization in China through economic
and cultural means. By using a literature review as well as reviewing the concepts of
democracy and prerequisites thereof, three scenarios for democratization will be
determined. Through the use of the information provided in the latter, I predict that while
democracy is possible in China, the state will not reform in the next 5 years by any
means. This is due to various factors including increased economic development and the
use of “Asian Values.”

Keywords: China, Political Regimes, Democracy, Asia, Chinese Democracy, Democratic
Transition
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

What are the factors that help or hinder democratization in China? Cultural and
economic factors are influencing the future course of Chinese politics every year, and
with a large economy and ever expanding cultural landscape, China cannot remain the
same forever. This literature review will provide reasons for why China can democratize
in the near future and what factors can help it. However, the most important need for
understanding democratization in China is what type of factors is most important to
democratization. I believe that cultural and economic arguments are the best
measurements for democratization because of the cultural influence from an ever
changing and growing populous and the economy has shaped governments of all kinds
around the world. However, among the two of these, economics is the stronger argument
of the two because the economy is more easily measured and can influence the impact of
cultural changes due to increasing globalization through the world market. The economy
holds a stronger argument here and so will be our main focus. However, cultural
arguments will still be analyzed and should always be considered when analyzing
democratization.
The analysis that follows is split into 7 chapters, beginning an analysis of
democracy and what it is defined as for the purposes of this literature review, as well as
the prerequisites for democracy through the economy. Since the emphasis of the
1

argument in this review is the economic argument, the prerequisites of democracy are
concentrated in that fact. Afterwards a literature of the main economic arguments such as
the development of the Chinese economy, how GDP influences democracy, the Asian
Values argument help analyze some of the economic arguments for or against
democratization. These factors help focus the arguments for or against democracy
through economic means. After economics, a short analysis of a couple cultural
arguments for and against democratization will be reviewed. While economics are the
concentration of the analysis, cultural arguments should always be considered since
economics alone may not influence democratization. After the literature reviews, three
scenarios will be suggested based on these arguments for or against democratization in
China, after which we will reach our conclusion. Democratization is possible in China,
but not for the next five years due to the strong influence of the central government,
“Asian Values”, and the success of the economy.
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CHAPTER 2

DEFINING DEMOCRACY

Democracies are regimes in which elections are free and fair and there is a
transition of leadership after elections. The most important note of this definition is that
the offices in question must be attained through elections (Cheibub 2010). Elections can
be done through three conditions: the outcome of the elections is not known; the winner
of the contest actually takes office; future elections follow the first two at regular
intervals (Cheibub 2010). To ensure the elections are in fact “democratic” as in
competitive and fair and not just merely elections for show, the democratic regime must
follow a couple more rules. The most important of these additional rules is the offices in
contest must be voted by popular election, there must be more than one party, and an
alteration in power according to electoral rules must have taken place (Cheibub 2010).
Robert Dahl defines “ideal democracy” as minimalist. This means that features of
a liberal democracy are determinants of the state or systems best “morals.” (Dahl 2014)
“An ideal system in this sense is a goal towards which a person or society ought to strive
(even if it is not perfectly attainable in practice) and a standard against which the moral
worth of what has been achieved, or of what exists, can be measured.” (Dahl 2014) A
minimalist democracy is a minimalist rational and representative structure, democracy
exists with in the forms of the ones who make the vote share equal representation and
rationality (freedom of decision) to elect officials and expect then transitions of power
3

(Przeworski 1999). Based on Dahl’s definition of an “ideal democracy” and the definition
in the former, a minimalist view of democracy is our best determinant for a baseline of
defining democratization.

4

CHAPTER 3

PREREQUISITES FOR DEMOCRACY

The prerequisites for democracy can be few and far between. By analyzing what
is most likely to produce a democracy, we can then find the prerequisites for democracy.
Seymour Lipset, political scientist, tackles some of the prerequisites for democracy and
claims that for a stable democracy, two complex characteristics must be in place:
economic development and legitimacy (Lipset 1959). For the purpose of prerequisites,
this study will concentrate on the economic prerequisites. These prerequisites of
democracy are not determinants of democracy but rather what qualities democracies tend
to have or transition from.
Lipset claims that economic development is constituted into four factors: wealth,
education, urbanization, and industrialization. For democracies, all of these factors are
very high on Lipsets scale. This leads us to believe that countries with better economies
tend to be more democratic (Lipset 1959). Higher education as well as higher levels of
wealth leads to a larger middle class, which should lead to higher political involvement.
These factors are keys to democratic development and so should be in place for
democracy to survive (Lipset 1959).
When remembering our minimalist definition of democracy, it is important to
note that Lipset also took precaution to approaching this subject. While the factors
mentioned in this chapter do help with the transition and stabilization of democracy, it is
5

up to the political actors in the state to determine the outcome of a transitional
government. The findings here must not be overly stressed, as unique events within a
state will determine the persistence for or against democracy (Lipset 1959). Lipset
mentions Max Weber’s theory that the differences in countries national patterns
according to historical events may help or hinder democratic reform. Weber argues that
once the democratic process starts, the next event in that particular countries history will
be critical for the survival of democratization (Lipset 1959). Lipset explains that in order
for democracy to survive, social institutions must be set in place for democratization to
go on. This is assuming that the institution that is holding democratic reforms wishes for
democracy to take form. This can be done in the form of setting up elections and the
process of a democratic regime such as the one mentioned in Chapter 2.
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CHAPTER 4

LITERATURE FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH THE ECONOMY

While many scholars have tried their hand at determining the level of democracy
in China as well as theorizing the possibility of democracy, some scholars have
determined reasons why China has not become a democracy yet. Mary Gallagher
analyzes why China has not become a democracy because of their incredible economic
boom over the past three decades. Her main argument is discussing China’s success with
Foreign Direct Investment (hereafter referred to as FDI) and why it has helped delay
political reform in China. This is important to discuss because other countries in East
Asia have found success in economic reforms such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan
(not formally a country), all of which are democracies. China has been able to avoid
political reform, and Gallagher attempts to explain why.
The main argument is that FDIs have delayed political reform because they have
created an environment in which it encourages political behavior conducive to rejecting
reform for the time being. This is because the Chinese have developed FDIs in the wrong
order for political reform (Gallagher 2002). China set up SOEs and separated
experiments for economic reform long before FDIs were popular in China. In theory,
FDIs should have come before these if they were to encourage political reform; instead,
they came after, and encouraged principles under the current regime. These FDIs have
encouraged competitiveness among different institutions in China’s economic latter. The
7

two main competitions are between domestic firms for FDI investment and between firms
for market share and skilled labor. By creating this competition, domestic companies
needed regulation and balance in order to keep up with foreign companies and foreigninvested enterprises, and so relied upon the government to issue labor laws and other
regulations in order to regulate the competition in China (Gallagher 2002). They also
joined organizations such as the World Trade Organization to further help with the
regulation of investment and growth of the market economy in China. This dependency
created a need for domestic companies to rely on the Chinese government to help with
their economic growth, and as long as the liberalization of FDIs continues, the less talk
there is of political liberalization.
Gallagher argues that because China was able to liberalize FDIs while balancing
domestic companies and the economy, there was no need for political liberalization. This
hinders democratic reform in China due to balancing economic reform and transition in
regime development. This brings to light an interesting scenario: what if China’s
economy never sees significant downturn?
Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi support Gallagher’s point as they have
developed a model for measuring democratic transition in terms of economic
development. They discuss that how a state develops their economy is not a factor of the
economy developing into a more democratic state. Instead, a more developed economy at
a certain income per capita ($6,000) leads some authoritarian and dictatorship regimes to
become stabilized (Przeworski 1997). China’s economy has steadily grown over the past
five years from $5,574 (GDP) in 2011 to $7,593 (GDP) in 2014 (The World Bank 2014).
Given Przeworski and others findings of high levels of income correlating with
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democracy, China should soon transition towards a democracy within the next five years.
However, no signs of decline in the central government have taken place. In fact, one
could assume that the central government has maintained tighter control given the recent
events of the failed Falon Gong movement and Hong Kong protests as well as significant
maneuvers into the South China Sea.
So does the how the Chinese economy develops matter in transitioning for
reform? According to Przeworski, no, how a country develops its economy is not a matter
for if or when a country transitions from authoritarian rule. This is determined by
political actors within the country at any given level of development (Przeworski 1997).
Gallagher’s theory is rooted in the basis that economic reforms before outside influence
could touch the economy was the main factor in preventing reform during development.
These theories and hypotheses merely help us determine the likelihood of certain events
such as a transition towards democracy in authoritarian regimes. Yet how the economic
factors of Chinese development over the past few decades both help and hinder
democracy. According to Przeworski and Gallagher, the development of the Chinese
economy plays a major role in what may or may not be political reform in the future. As
China’s economy continually grows, one should remain observant of the changes in the
growth of the Chinese middle class, as they have the most to gain from economic
development.
The “Asian Values” argument was implemented first by Lee Kwan Yew, the
former leader of Singapore (Elgin 2010). “修身齐家治国平天下 (Xiushen qijia zhiguo
pingtianxia)” is how Lee Kuan Yew defines the “Asian Model” (Zakaria 2009). He
defines this quote as the culmination of a few principles that Asian nations follow to hold

9

order within their country. Lee Kuan Yew defines these principles as follows: Xiushen is
looking after yourself, cultivating yourself; Qijia is to look after the family; Zhiguo is to
look after your country; pingtianxia means that all is peaceful under heaven though it
translates better as pacify your country (Zakaria 2009).
This definition of the “Asian Model” is the basis for “Asian Values” and how Lee
Kuan Yew defines East Asia as different from countries like the United States. “Asian
Values” as a doctrine argues that democracy is a hindrance to development, and so an
authoritarian regime is needed to promote a faster developing economy (Thompson
2001). This argument is used by mainly authoritarian regimes (Singapore, China, etc.) to
the criticisms of not making more democratic reforms. It is a justification of authoritarian
rule until economic development fits the “mold” of developing more democratic reforms
(Thompson 2001). However, who is to determine when development has reached a point
for justified democratic reform? This problem is why “Asian Values” is a hindrance of
democratic reform in China as well as the rest of the Asia Pacific region.
Kim Dae Jung argues that “Asian Values” is not a valid contender against
western-style reforms. Jung takes several of Lee Kuan Yew’s statements and expounds
upon how they do not apply the changing landscape of East Asia. Lee claims that family
oriented practices are the reason for success in modernization and economic development
in East Asia (Jung 1994). This is why democratic reforms do not work in East Asian
countries because of the difference in cultural models. However, as mentioned before,
“Asian Values” is merely a validation of authoritarian rule till democracy is ready to take
place at the right moment of development (Thompson 2001). Lee’s claims make no effort
to self-evaluate the changing political and cultural standard in East Asia such as the rise
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in individualism as opposed to collectivism (Jung 1994). Also, Lee claims that
governments shy away from personal matters where the family can take control.
However, the opposite is true and East Asian governments, democratic or not, intrude in
the affairs of the people regularly, especially the government of Singapore (Jung 1994).
“Asian Values” has many flaws towards its argument, but it is one cultural excuse that
can prevent and so hinder democratic reform.
While in Singapore, strict governmental rule maintains stability whilst using
cultural values as a justification (Elgin 2010); China has used “Asian Values” as a
catalyst for unification. China is currently one of the worlds leading economies, and the
largest in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). China’s Liu Xiaobo, a political reform activist,
argued that China’s government argues against reforms on subjects such as human rights
on the basis of “national differences” and “traditions.” (Thompson 2001) This correlates
with the “Asian Values” argument of placing a high emphasis on cultural identity as
opposed to political reform. However, the problem with China is that in its early modern
history the PRC tried to destroy past cultural identifiers through the Cultural Revolution.
During this time, China underwent one of the most devastating losses of cultural artifacts
in history. Following this, government officials argued for a more “developmentalist”
argument that democracy must be delayed in favor of economic development (Thompson
2001).
Presently, China has been calling back to their cultural roots as a move towards
uniformity. In April 2014, the PRC Ministry of Education issued guidelines for schools,
primary education through college, to teach traditional culture in the classroom (Ying
2015). Xi Jingping stated, “China's cultural genes should be planted in the minds of the
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young.” (Ying 2015) While not calling on “Asian Values” in particular, as China
develops it becomes increasing clear that the state wishes to maintain their loose
homogeneity through cultural values. Just as Singapore invoked their own cultural
identity as a means to justify harsh authoritarian rule, China claims cultural identity to set
themselves a part from “western” style reforms.
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CHAPTER 5

LITERATURE FOR DEMOCRATIZATION THROUGH CULTURE

Andrew Nathan is a leading scholar in the study of what could be future
democratic movements in China. His article coauthored with Tianjin Shi Cultural
Requisites for Democracy in China: Findings from a Survey analyzes how democracy
can work in China from the cultural perspective of Chinese citizens. The study analyzes
how we should approach the study and why it is important or pertinent to the future of
what could be in China.
Nathan and Shi pull from James Gibson and Raymond Duch for their study.
Gibson and Duch identified 5 conducive values of democracy. Nathan and Shi
determined that out of the 5, 3 of them would be appropriate for a study of democracy in
China. They are as follows: 1) how citizens perceive the government is salient to their
lives as having an impact on them and their families; 2) do people believe that they have
the capability to understand and engage in politics? ; 3) to what extent are citizens
prepared to be tolerant of those who hold different political beliefs? (Nathan 1993)
Through these, Nathan and Shi determined two things, the prospect of democracy in
China and Chinese cultural distinctiveness.
Nathan and Shi analyzed political impact and how the people perceive the
government impacts their daily lives. Most citizens’ education level, which had an
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equivalent of primary school or less, felt that the government had no impact on them
whatsoever (Nathan 1993). This is troubling from the perspective of possible democracy
in China because based on Nathan’s first principle, the government being salient to the
people’s lives, is non-existent.
The second set of surveys measured political efficacy, or what is defined as “the
feeling that individual political actions does have, or can have, an impact upon the
political process.” (Campbell 1954) Nathan examines two sub sections of political
efficacy, which are internal, an individual’s competence of understanding and
participating in politics, and external efficacy, the beliefs about the responsiveness of the
government (Nathan 1993). Beginning with internal efficacy, the Chinese believe they
understand local affairs more than they do national affairs. They also believe they could
be leaders in local governments more so than they could in national government (Nathan
1993). Less educated people are more likely not to understand the national government
whereas the more educated people, typically some college and above do understand the
national government and it’s impact (Nathan 1993). Since the sample reported is mostly
uneducated on the intricacies of the national government, then few are likely to want
reform on a national level. However, as the country develops, so will education levels
(The World Bank 2000).
Turning to external efficacy, the sample was surveyed on how Chinese citizens
expected the government to give them equal treatment. The least educated, the majority,
expected equal treatment. However, the most educated at a university level were the
majority of those who wrote they thought they expected less expectations of equal
treatment (Nathan 1993). This can be attributed, as Nathan suggests, that as you grow
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more educated and more successful, if one finds a block in trying to achieve a goal, the
only logical choice is to turn to unconventional political activities. This is either opposing
the political system or taking advantage of their loopholes, or even expressing frustration
at the matter (Nathan 1993). As the population grows more educated, it may be more
likely that they will develop a cultural attitude conducive to democracy.
The last study was that of political tolerance, or the equality of citizens and
protection of minority rights (Nathan 1993). The study found that China was more
intolerant than all other countries surveyed with it. It was linked to education levels, with
Chinese illiterates being the least tolerant. Also at higher levels of education, when
compared with other countries such as Australia, Germany, and Italy, China was still the
least tolerant (Nathan 1993). This is in line with others such as Almond and Verba’s
Civic Culture. Nathan and Shi repeatedly refer to Almond and Verba’s Civic Culture
throughout the study. Political tolerance of other parties varies greatly based on an
ideology index, the greater the separation in ideology, and the greater the conflict
(Putnam 1971).
Nathan and Shi’s findings have suggested that for the possibility of democracy
in China, if the regime starts to transition, they will find many troubles. Some include the
difficulty in political engagement, for fear of government retaliation or otherwise. Also
fear that most citizens will be politically intolerant of their peers, be it their education
levels or ethnicity. Nathan believes that with the right balance of educated and
uneducated, stability can be brought to the country through transition thus helping the
case for democracy.
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In Bruce Dickson’s Who Want’s to be a Communist? Career Incentives and
Mobilized Loyalty in China, we have a unique take on modern thoughts of democracy in
China from the perspective of how people view aspects of democracy (voting) and being
apart of the Chinese Communist Party (further referred to as the CCP). In 1978, after
Deng Xiaoping helped pass electoral law, the people could vote directly for local
officials. Dickson analyzed democracy and voting behavior through CCP membership in
how likely they were to vote based on factors such as age, income, party participation,
and the people’s satisfaction with the level of democracy (personal freedom, economic
prosperity).
How does members of the CCP voting relate back to democracy in China? The
findings in the study saw that the more satisfied with democracy was practiced in China
(voting and voting practices) the more likely they were to vote (Dickson 2014). Age also
had a factor in this, as the younger the voter, the more likely they were to vote. The
people vote for what they believe will either help them-selves or keep the status quo
(Dickson 2014). Harry Harding argues this point as well, saying that the central
government is doing this to revitalize institutions (Zheng 1994). Voting, while in nondemocratic elections, does give experience with elections, which could be useful for
democratic reforms.
The final part of Dickson’s study was finding who was more likely to support
central institutions and local institutions of government. This was based on a number of
factors including satisfaction of level of democracy (personal freedom, economic
prosperity), age, CCP membership, GDP, per capita GDP, education, and gender
(Dickson 2014). It revealed that those with CCP membership were more likely to support
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the political regime and keep the status quo. However, the results between the central and
local governments differed significantly. People were more likely to support the central
political institutions and criticize the local institutions based on dissatisfaction with their
local officials (Dickson 2014). The fact the study found that CCP members are less likely
to support local institutions is unexpected since the party wants their members to support
all levels of government. However, this may create an incentive to want to change the
current system from within. As seen in Andrew Nathan’s study, Chinese citizens feel
they could participate in leadership roles at the local level (Nathan 1993). This
concentration on the central party’s status quo is a hindrance to democracy. Promoting
the reigning institution hurts the chances of reform and promotes the PRC as an
unchanging presence.
It seems that the more people are dissatisfied with the economic conditions and
local affairs, the more likely they are to protest and want more personal and economic
freedoms. The CCP has been dealing with this problem by making the reforms necessary
to adapt to rapid development in areas such as the media, politics, and the economy
(Zheng 1994). By being more open to the central government and promoting young
voters into the CCP, the PRC is curbing more democratic reforms and adapting to current
modern development in an authoritarian regime. However, as reform comes so do the
consequences of change, and as the young become more individualistic (Zheng 1994) the
more the government will have to reform from collectivism or collective interest.
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CHAPTER 6

SCENARIOS FOR DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

The first scenario would be to allow for democracy to take its course in China.
Many of the readings on the arguments of “Asian Values” and economic development
such as Przeworski (Chapter 4) suggest that democracy will make its appearance when a
certain level of economic development takes place. It is not uncommon to see
authoritarian regimes collapse and transition at a certain economic level (Przeworski
1997). However, the guarantee of democracy as outlined in Chapter 4 is not certain on
economic development alone. This is where the argument of “Asian Values” comes into
play. In Chapter 4, we examined what “Asian Values” means and how it is used.
According to the rhetoric, “Asian Values” is the argument to maintain an authoritarian
rule until development allows for democratic reforms (Thompson 2001). Taking into
account the economic and “Asian Values” argument, all we must do is wait for
democracy to take its form in China.
Assuming the Chinese government adapts to the changing world market, the
Chinese may not have to transition to democracy at all. Taking into consideration
Gallagher’s argument about FDI’s non-existent influence on the Chinese economy, and
China’s economy being the largest in the world (largest in PPP) then China may not have
a reason to transition. If outside influences have no effect on the developing economy,
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then democracy may not be needed or influenced in China due to economic pressures.
Also, since the economy is so developed and growing, the population can be complacent
with transition due to the satisfaction with their current economic status. It also allows for
the central government to have a strong influence on policy since there is no economic
pressure to change.
A third and final scenario could be that as China’s economy grows, so doe’s
education levels due to increasing wages. As wages increase, the more likely parents can
afford educations for their children and as urbanization is also rapidly increasing due to
industrialization and a turn from the sleepy agrarian society, children are more likely to
have access to education. Lipset’s argument that education and wealth correlate with
democratic states, as well as with Nathan and Shi’s findings that the more educated a
citizen is the more likely they are politically active. This could mean a democratic
transition in China if more of the population becomes educated and wealthy, creating a
large middle class and pressure domestically on the Chinese government to cater to
economic and personal rights of Chinese citizens that could mean democratic style
reforms. As more Chinese become wealthy, the more influence they have on the
economic and political landscape of China. China, given these possible factors could
democratize due to the economic growth in wealth of their own people.
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CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

If when we analyze political movements, cultural standards, or economic reforms
within China without first understanding the Chinese perspective, then a true
understanding will never happen (Harding 1982). Understanding the Chinese perspective
on the economy and what factors influence it can help us realize what helps or hinders
democratization in China, be it how the economy develops, the “Asian Values”
argument, or the influence of the GDP. The economy may be the largest influence on
what will help democratization in China, but currently there is no sign that China will
democratize in the near future.
While the signs and implications for reform are present in modern China, the
government still holds too much control over the people and economy to be put down or
reformed. The only way China will liberalize their political system in my opinion is if the
economy falters. If the economy falters, then political reform may not be far behind,
however, if it is democratic reform we do not know, nor can we easily predict. However,
hindrances on democracy are currently too great for transition to take place and may not
be possible for the next five years.
These assumptions can only be made in speculation and assumption, with out
hard evidence from this decade, it is hard to tell how modern Chinese citizens believe in
the terms of democracy could mean for the perception of Chinese elites on capitalism and
20

democracy in China. This may only be the study of a very presumptuous hypothesis, but
democracy is possible in China given the right factors.
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